Introduction

Nowadays the majority of electronic devices use the Bluetooth technology to communicate with other equipment.

For example smartband, headphones, car audio, body scale, medical devices, etc ...

Bluetooth is very useful to make possible the interconnection of different devices, but at the same time it also presents various data security risks. While supporting the use of key authentication and encryption, many devices rely on a four-digit numeric PIN and not much more secure passwords.

Therefore, the goal of the following work is to exploit the vulnerabilities of BLE technology used by a body fat scale to communicate the detected parameters to a mobile device.

Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)

Bluetooth Low Energy (Bluetooth LE, colloquially BLE, formerly marketed as Bluetooth Smart) is a wireless personal area network technology designed and marketed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (Bluetooth SIG) for new applications in healthcare, fitness, and security, for the home entertainment industry and for the automotive and automation industries.

The difference to the "classic" Bluetooth technology: Bluetooth Low Energy is intended to provide significantly lower power consumption and cost while maintaining a similar communication range.

Bluetooth devices have the ability to implement security measures for pairing (called pairing) and subsequently for communication.

In the first case it is possible to implement a pin (usually 6 characters) to be typed on the device to be connected, in the second case the transmitted data can be symmetrically encrypted with the AES-128 algorithm.

Poweradd body fat scale data interpretation (BLE)

We bought a Poweradd Body Fat scale ¹, this device supports height body parameters such as:

- Weight
- Body water
- Body fat
- Visceral fat
- Bone weight
- BMI
- BMR
- Muscle mass

This scale communicates the transmitted data with the **HealthU** $+^{2}$ app, available on the play store.

In our case (as is often the case) neither of the two security measures was put in place. In case the pairing was protected by the pin it would still be possible to decrypt the transmitted packets thanks to the crackle software.

In order to sniff the traffic it was necessary to have a bluetooth dongle available, which implements the monitor mode that allows sniffing of the surrounding traffic. The device we have equipped ourselves with is the ubertooth one³.

Uberthoot One

The Ubertooth One is an open source Bluetooth test tool from Michael Ossmann. It is the world's first affordable Bluetooth monitoring and development platform and is a fully open source product (both hardware and software).

Steps performed :

- 1. (terminal) mkfifo /tmp/pipe
- 2. (wireshark) add as a pipe interface /tmp/pipe and run
- 3. (teminal) ubertooth-btle -f -c /tmp/pipe
- 4. (wireshark) save file as .pcap or .pcapng

https://www.amazon.it/Poweradd-composizione-analizzatore-Technology-idratazione/dp/B079BCYQS

² <u>https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lefu.healthu&hl=en_US&gl=US</u>

³ <u>https://greatscottgadgets.com/ubertoothone/</u>

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App	ly a	display filter <१	€/>												
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	41	2.267125	cf:e3:1	7:19:	02:26	В	roadca	st			LE L	L	69	ADV IND	
	42	2.307126	cf:e3:1	7:19:	02:26	В	roadca	ast			LE L	L	69	ADV_IND	
	43	2.327073	7a:00:f	d:8c:	6a:28	В	roadca	ast			LE L	L	63	ADV_IND	
	44	2.354628	cf:e3:1	7:19:	02:26	В	roadca	ast			LE L	L	69 <i>i</i>	ADV_IND	
	45	2.404630	cf:e3:1	7:19:	02:26	В	roadca	ast			LE L	L	69	ADV_IND	
	46	2.498384	cf:e3:1	7:19:	02:26	В	roadca	st			LE L	L	69 <i>i</i>	ADV_IND	
	47	2.544635	cf:e3:1	7:19:	02:26	В	roadca	ast			LE L	L	69 <i>i</i>	ADV_IND	
	48	2.588387	cf:e3:1	7:19:	02:26	В	roadca	st			LE L	L	69 <i>i</i>	ADV_IND	
	49	2.637139	cf:e3:1	7:19:	02:26	В	roadca	st			LE L	L	69 <i>i</i>	ADV_IND	
	50	2.684641	cf:e3:1	7:19:	02:26	В	roadca	st			LE L	L	69 <i>i</i>	ADV_IND	
	51	2.729643	cf:e3:1	7:19:	02:26	В	roadca	st			LE L	L	69	ADV_IND	
· · ·	57	7 7771 / E	cf. 2.1	7.10.	07.76	D	roader	x.+			1 - 1	1	60		
	► F	lags													
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	• •	lanufacturer S	pecific												
		Length: 20													
		Type: Manufa	acturer S	Speci	fic (0)	xff)									
		Company ID:	Ericsso	ו Tecl	hnology	y Lic	ensin	g (0x	0000)						
	J	Data: cfe31	7190226c ⁻	F0000	020800	00000	001c4								
	CRC	0xe1ff3b												0	
0010	89	14 80 01 0a	fe 09 00) d6	be 89	8e (00 24	26 02	2.			••••\$&•			
0020	19	17 e3 cf 02	01 05 05	6 02	f0 ff	12 1	L8 14	ff 00) .	• • • •					
0030	00	cf e3 17 19	02 26 c1	• 00	00 02	08 0	00 00	00 00) .	• • • •	۰ · ۰	• • • • • • •			
0040	01	C4 8/ TT 0C								• • • •					
0 7	O Tata (btcommon.eir_ad.entry.data), 17 bytes														

Figure 1. Some of the captured traffic.

We try to understand the hex string:

Туре	Comp. ID	MAC	Scale Type	Weight	Impedance set	Impedanc e
FF	0000	CFE31719022 6	CF	0208	01	c4

To make the process of understanding the data easier it was necessary to retrieve the manual of the chip (Holtek Body Fat Scale MCU HT45F75)⁴

The parameters set to zero and always zero in the various measurements is due to the fact that the chip inside the scale is not fully used. Below some photos of the chipset.

⁴ <u>https://www.holtek.com/productdetail/-/vg/45F75</u>

To understand the use of the data sent, it was necessary to reverse engineer the app, retrieving the .apk file through ApkPure.

In this phase, various tools have been used to have the possibility to debug a phone without root permissions.

Tools:

- Adb
- Jadx
- Dex2jar
- Android Studio

With adb it was possible to interface with the device and perform a backup of the data saved by the app.

adb backup -f mybackup.ab -apk com.myapp

The .ab file or the backup was converted to a tar using openssl

dd if=mybackup.ab bs=24 skip=1|openssl zlib -d > mybackup.tar

Unpacked in the following way

tar tvf mybackup.tar

In the extracted folder /apps/com.lefu.healthu/ we find the db folder where all the db created by the app are present.

Our Attention was focused on the nationalEnergy.db db which contains the tables shown in the screenshot, the records recorded with the scale are present in the BODY_FAT table.

• •	DB Browser fo	or SQLite - /Users/ar	angelo/apps/com.le	efu.healthu/db/nationalEne	ergy.db
Nuovo Database 🕞 Apri Database 🗸	Salva le modifiche	😰 Ripristina le modifie	he 🎲 Apri Proç	getto 😭 Salva Progetto	Collega Database
Struttura database Naviga nei dati	Modifica Pragmas	Esegui SQL	80		Modifica cella
🕞 Crea tabella 🛛 👌 Crea Indice 🍃 Modifi	ca Tabella 🛛 📑 Elimi	ina tabella	Modalità: 1	Testo 🗘 🙀 💻	Importa Espoi
Nome	Tipo	Schema			
▼ III Tabelle (6)			NULL		
BODY_FAT		CREATE TABLE "BO	D'		
DEVICE_INFO		CREATE TABLE "DE	/1		
USER_INFO	► USER_INFO CREATE TABLE "U				
▶ 🗐 WIFI_UNCLAIM_DATA		CREATE TABLE "WI	1		
android_metadata	CREATE TABLE and	·o			
sqlite_sequence	CREATE TABLE sqli	e_			
📎 Indici (0)					
Viste (0)					
Triggers (0)					

Figure 2. Available Tables

Fields of BODY_FAT table:

Nome	Тіро	Schema
▼ III Tabelle (6)		
▼ 🔲 BODY_FAT		CREATE TABLE "BODY_FAT" ("_id" IN
🛃 _id	INTEGER	"_id" INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOIN
	TEXT	"UID" TEXT
INFO_ID	TEXT	"INFO_ID" TEXT
📄 FAT	REAL	"FAT" REAL NOT NULL
MUSCLE_KG	REAL	"MUSCLE_KG" REAL NOT NULL
VISCERALFAT	REAL	"VISCERALFAT" REAL NOT NULL
METABOLIZE	INTEGER	"METABOLIZE" INTEGER NOT NULL
WATERCONTENT	REAL	"WATERCONTENT" REAL NOT NULL
BONE_KG	REAL	"BONE_KG" REAL NOT NULL
PROTEIN	REAL	"PROTEIN" REAL NOT NULL
NOFAT_WEIGHT_KG	REAL	"NOFAT_WEIGHT_KG" REAL NOT NUL
OBS_LEVEL	INTEGER	"OBS_LEVEL" INTEGER NOT NULL
SUB_FAT	REAL	"SUB_FAT" REAL NOT NULL
BODY_AGE	INTEGER	"BODY_AGE" INTEGER NOT NULL
BODY_SCORE	INTEGER	"BODY_SCORE" INTEGER NOT NULL
BODY_TYPE	INTEGER	"BODY_TYPE" INTEGER NOT NULL
STANDARD_WEIGHT_KG	REAL	"STANDARD_WEIGHT_KG" REAL NOT
	REAL	"WEIGHT_KG" REAL NOT NULL
SEX	INTEGER	"SEX" INTEGER NOT NULL
	REAL	"HEIGHT" REAL NOT NULL
AGE	INTEGER	"AGE" INTEGER NOT NULL
IMPEDANCE	INTEGER	"IMPEDANCE" INTEGER NOT NULL
FLAG	INTEGER	"FLAG" INTEGER NOT NULL
TIME STAMP	INTEGER	"TIME STAMP" INTEGER NOT NULL

Figure 3.

Much of this data was useful in understanding what values sent were and how they were calculated.

Following the logs produced by the application when the data was received, this string was logged: "locked-weight ------ 82.3 impedanceInt = 2.3"

This log does not refer to the hexadecimal string explained above and allowed us to find the class that dealt with the interpretation of the data sent in the form of hexadecimal converted into bytes and then interpreted.

Below is a screen of the class that deals with interpretation.

_apkpure.com [~/ApkProjects/HealthU_v1.5.5_apkpure.com] - ~/Downloads/HealthU_v1.5.5_apkpure.com.apk (1)/sources/defpackage/bnm.java								
	🔺 HealthU_v1.5.5_apkpure.com 🔻 🔲 Pixel 2 API 28 💌 🕨 🚓 🗮 🖏 🕰 🖬 🖿							
HealthU_v1.5.5_a	apkpure.com.apk 🛛 🧟 bnl.java 🗡 🧟 ayu.java 🗴 🧟 bnn.java 🗴 🤷 bnm.java 🗴 🕼 sa.java 🗴 😋 bbs.java 🗴 🕦 ayz.java 🗴 🟭 Androidl							
Q- locked \nearrow \uparrow \downarrow Ω_{c} \dagger_{Π} \neg_{Π} \boxtimes_{Π} \blacksquare Match Case \Box Words \Box Regex ? 3 matches								
220	<pre>String substring2 = substring.substring(0, 2);</pre>							
221 👳	<pre>if (substring2.equals("CF")) {</pre>							
222	<pre>String substring3 = substring(6, 8);</pre>							
223	<pre>String substring4 = substring.substring(8, 10);</pre>							
224	<pre>double c = (double) c(str: substring4 + substring3);</pre>							
225	Double.isNaN(c);							
226	double d = c / 100.0d;							
227	<pre>int a2 = a(bnq2.c);</pre>							
228	<pre>String substring5 = substring.substring(10, 12);</pre>							
229	<pre>String substring6 = substring.substring(12, 14);</pre>							
230	<pre>String substring7 = substring.substring(14, 16);</pre>							
231	<pre>int c2 = c(str: substring7 + substring6 + substring5);</pre>							
232	<pre>int i = bnq2.b;</pre>							
233	final int i2 = c2;							
234	4 bnr bnr = new bnr(d, (double) bnq2.a, a2, i, i2, sa.a, sa.a, str: "CF", bno.a());							
235	<pre>final String substring8 = substring.substring(18, 20);</pre>							
236	<pre>final double d2 = d;</pre>							
237	final bni bni2 = bni;							
238	final bnr bnr2 = bnr;							
239	<pre>final String str3 = str2;</pre>							
240	<pre>final bno bno2 = bno;</pre>							
241	<pre>new Handler(Looper.getMainLooper()).post(new Runnable() {</pre>							
242 📭 📴	<pre>public void run() {</pre>							
243	<pre>if (substring8.equals("01")) {</pre>							
244	bbq.b(str: "progress weight " + d2);							
245	bni2.a(bnr2);							
246	return;							
247	}							
248	bbq.b(str: "Locked weight " + d2 + "impedanceInt " + i2);							
249	<pre>bnp bnp = new bnp(str3, bno2.a());</pre>							
750								

Figura 4.

The attention was focused on to the function c (string param) on line 224 which retrieves the bytes (inverting them) and performs the following operation.



Figure 5.

As well as the interpretation of a number in hexadecimal and corresponds to our weight. Then, starting from this and the data saved in the application database, all the rest are calculated. The last quartet of bits is used for the impedance or the parameter that allows you to divide the fat mass from the lean one.

Now we will be able to send any weight we want, without needing a scale.

The analysis of the body fat scale is documented below. This step allowed us to see the chip used, and the fact that some values were always 0 due to the partial use of this by the scale manufacturers.

It would also be possible to retrieve the firmware and understand it, since the documentation is available on the manufacturer's website.









